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John Snow Labs Inc.

A MULTI-DOMAIN RED TEAMING FRAMEWORK FOR SAFETY, ROBUSTNESS, AND FAIRNESS EVALUATION OF MEDICAL LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

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CLINICAL LLMS IN HEALTHCARE

- LLMs are increasingly used in healthcare (clinician support, administration, patient-facing tools).
- Outputs can be plausible yet unsafe, biased, or outside clinical scope.
- Small changes in wording or missing context can cause large shifts in recommendations.

LIMITATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL MEDICAL BENCHMARKS

- Many evaluations are narrow QA or static setups.
- They often miss adversarial, ambiguous, and ethically complex interactions.
- Average accuracy can hide worst-case failures that matter clinically.

WHAT'S MISSING TODAY

- Need a unified, multi-domain red teaming framework grounded in clinical scenarios.
- Must cover safety, robustness, ethics, fairness, privacy, toxicity, integration—not only factual QA.
- Need structured scoring aligned with clinical practice and governance expectations.

OUR STUDY: GOALS AND SCOPE

- Evaluate 11 contemporary LLMs on 690 clinically grounded scenarios.
- 9 evaluation domains, 150+ subcategories.
- Focus on variance, minimum scores, and failure patterns—not only means.
- Text-centric scenarios connect to Text2Story: narrative perturbations changing outcomes.

RED TEAMING & ADVERSARIAL MUTATIONS

- Red teaming: systematic stress-testing with safety-relevant prompts to reveal failure modes before deployment.
- Adversarial transformations: controlled edits (wording, demographics, missing context, contradictions) reflecting realistic communication errors.



DATASET CONSTRUCTION

- Authored/reviewed by three clinicians with 3+ years AI safety experience.
- 1,500 scenarios prepared → random subset of 690 used for evaluation.
- Covers patient-facing, clinician decision-making, admin/operational tasks.
- Nine principal categories: Clinical accuracy; Safety & reliability; Medical errors; Bias & equity; Privacy & security; Ethical reasoning; Robustness; Toxicity; System integration.

MODELS EVALUATED

- GPT-3.5 Turbo,
- GPT-4o,
- GPT-4o-mini,
- GPT-5,
- Claude Opus 4.1,
- Gemini 2.5 Pro,
- X-BAI,
- GPT-OSS-20B,
- GPT-OSS-120B,
- CALM v2,
- CALM v3

SCORING: 7-DIMENSION RUBRIC + HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP

- Responses scored on seven dimensions aligned with clinical/ethical/regulatory guidance.
- LLM-assisted scoring with a strong judge model (GPT-5) + explicit instructions.
- Humans review: all high-risk cases, all disagreements, random sample of routine cases.
- Final scores assigned only after human confirmation.

SCORING: 7-DIMENSION RUBRIC + HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP



WHAT WE MEASURE (BEYOND THE MEAN)

- Micro/macro averages + SD, IQR, min/max across dimensions.
- Instability: high variance, wide quartile spread, low minimums.
- Clinical risk lens: worst-case behavior and inconsistency matter.

OVERALL PERFORMANCE ACROSS 690 SCENARIOS

- Composite mean scores: 0.791 (Gemini 2.5 Pro) to 0.984 (X-BAI).
- SD roughly 0.05–0.21 (model-dependent).
- Top tier with high means + relatively tight dispersion: X-BAI, GPT-5, Claude Opus 4.1.
- Several models show minimum score = 0.00 on at least one prompt → complete failure on an individual safety-critical vignette.

Model	Mean	SD	Median	Min–Max
CALM v2	0.935	0.106	1.000	0.19–1.00
CALM v3	0.926	0.125	1.000	0.00–1.00
X-BAI	0.984	0.050	1.000	0.63–1.00
GPT-3.5 Turbo	0.887	0.091	0.917	0.53–1.00
GPT-4o Mini	0.936	0.076	0.958	0.42–1.00
GPT-4o	0.948	0.068	0.958	0.47–1.00
GPT-5	0.979	0.051	1.000	0.53–1.00
GPT-OSS-20B	0.956	0.085	1.000	0.27–1.00
GPT-OSS-120B	0.964	0.080	1.000	0.33–1.00
Claude Opus 4.1	0.973	0.070	1.000	0.00–1.00
Gemini 2.5 Pro	0.791	0.208	0.849	0.00–1.00

HIGH AVERAGE SCORES CAN MASK CLINICAL RISK

- A model can look strong on aggregate metrics yet fail catastrophically in specific cases.
- For patient safety, tail risk often dominates “average correctness.”
- Reporting should include dispersion and worst-case indicators—not only means.

PERFORMANCE VARIES BY DOMAIN

- Stronger domains: Safety & Reliability, Medical Errors.
- More challenging / volatile: Bias & Equity, Clinical Accuracy & Validity.
- Hardest operational areas: liability/accountability, coding/billing (~0.79–0.83 means).
- Near-ceiling procedural areas: guideline conformance, information flow (≥0.97).
- Equity-related stress tests: 10–20% error amplification under demographic modifications.



STABILITY ACROSS DOMAINS

- Top models tend to show lower domain-level dispersion.
- Weaker models show higher variance and sensitivity to adversarial patterns.



HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP FINDINGS

- 10% of outputs reviewed (760 responses): high-risk + disagreements + random routine.
- Common failure mode: empathetic tone hides missing safety actions (e.g., escalation).
- Fairness counterfactuals: recommendation shifts without clinical justification—sometimes missed by automation.
- Conclusion: hybrid evaluation is necessary for credible safety assessment.

LARGE GAPS BETWEEN SYSTEMS

- System Integration & Operational Impact: about Δ 0.20–0.30 between top and bottom systems.
- Clinical Accuracy & Validity: about Δ 0.13–0.15.
- Strong alignment/medical specialization tends to improve both mean and dispersion.



KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Variance + minimum performance often matter more than mean scores for clinical reliability.
- Robustness does not automatically imply fairness stability (partially decoupled).
- Automation + clinician oversight is essential for safety-critical evaluation.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT

- Avoid using medical LLMs as autonomous decision-makers.
- Position as decision support with clear scope boundaries.
- Implement escalation pathways for high-risk outputs.
- Add continuous monitoring + fairness auditing + counterfactual testing.

LIMITATIONS & FUTURE WORK

- Synthetic structured scenarios (not real patient interactions).
- Mostly single-turn prompt–response (not full clinical workflows).
- Human review is targeted (~10%), not exhaustive.
- Snapshot: models change with updates.
- Future: multi-turn dialogues, workflow-level evaluation, longitudinal red teaming.

QUESTIONS?

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